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Ways of Being of Equipment:  
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Abstract  
The paper lays out an ontological enquiry into the ways 
of „being of equipment‟ as analysed by Heidegger and its 
role in understanding the design process. Equipments are 
things that make up our world. It is hard to imagine 
living without things because our existence is thingly 
textured. Heidegger‟s analytics of equipment far exceeds 
the ontic sense of things. The argument is that there is a 
danger when designers limit themselves with the ontic 
understanding of equipment. Such an understanding 
coaxes us to believe in the half-baked truth about 
equipment - an isolated instance of a piece of artifact and 
leaves us ignorant of the equipment's character as a part 
of an equipment structure. An ontological reflection on 
equipment brings forth its relational nature and can be 
rewarding in several ways in improving its design 
process.  
Keywords: Equipment, Tool Analysis, Ontology, Ready-to-hand, 
Being, Design, Metaphysics of Presence, Applied Heidegger 
1. Introduction 
Traditional ontology was interested in finding out the different 
kinds of entities in the world.  For example, Aristotle in his 
Categories was interested in classifying the beings (onta) there are 
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and wanted to identify the beings that are most fundamental and 
real within that classification (Shields, 2007). Instead of asking what 
are the kinds of entities, in Being and Time, Heidegger asked the 
question differently: “what are the kinds of ways that entities can be 
in the world?”(Riemer & Johnston, 2014, p. 276). Heideggerian 
method is not focussed on giving a list of different kinds of entities 
like Aristotle did but looks at the way they are. Our world is 
constituted of many different kinds of beings: humans, artefacts, 
plants, animals, water and so on. According to Heidegger, it is 
possible for these entities to have multiple ways of „being‟ in the 
world.  He discusses the different ways of Dasein‟s being-in-the-
world in Being and Time.1  Heidegger takes effort in Being and Time 
to make his readers understand the unitary relationship that exists 
between the different components of Dasein‟s being-in-the-world.  
They are (1) the notion of “being-in” 2) the concept of “the world” 
in which existence is located (3) that which is in the world, namely 
“the who” or “the self”. According to Heidegger, the best way to 
study Dasein‟s existential constitution is by turning to what is 
“ontically closest” to us, that is, our everyday situations 
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 69). We must try to understand ourselves in 
the act of everyday existence, in Heideggerian terms, in our 
everydayness (p. 69). But this is a challenging task because the 
moment we look at ourselves, we are likely to misinterpret 
ourselves.  A common error is viewing oneself as essentially 
detached; Heidegger considers this as a consequence of a long 
ontologically misleading Cartesian tradition that has been accepted 
over a period of time without questioning. 
The first job Heidegger takes up in Being and Time is to deconstruct 
this idea and establish that humans are not spectators, but engaged 
actors in everyday situations which is best expressed through the 
expression, Dasein-being-in-the-world (p. 69). This implies that 
humans are engaged beings immersed in a living context which 
comprises things, people, other living beings, culture and so on.  
The content may vary from person to person as well as from 
context to context.  Nevertheless, a defining characteristic of human 
existence is that humans are at all-time actively engaged with their 
world.2It entails that if Dasein is being-in-the-world then the world 
itself is a part of the essential constitution of our existence. Further 
on, „equipment‟ is a constitutive element of Dasein‟s world. To 
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consider „equipment‟ as mere free-floating entities is a 
contradiction to its very nature. Rather, the equipment is Dasein‟s 
way of being. However, Dasein‟s mode of existence is different 
from the kind of existence of equipment in the world, characterised 
by spatiotemporal features (Heidegger, 1962, p. 121 & Heidegger, 
1988, p. 28).  Heidegger makes this distinction very explicit when 
he says that only Dasein can touch while a chair cannot touch 
though it touches the wall. The wall and the chair cannot engage 
each other in the way Dasein encounters the chair (Heidegger, 
1962, p.155). It is Dasein who can encounter entities within the 
world. If we follow the Heideggerian logic, the chairs, walls, 
computers, cars, hammers, tables are being encountered in Dasein‟s 
dealings with the world. They come into picture only on account of 
Dasein‟s engaged practices though they may exist as inert and 
independent of Dasein‟s practices.3 
2. Ready-to-Hand and Present-at-Hand 
Heidegger argues that artefacts can be in the world in two ways on 
the basis of how they are being encountered by Dasein in the 
course of his dealings with the world. Dasein usually encounters 
entities in its everyday world as ready-to-hand (Zuhandenheit) 
while at other times as present-at-hand (Vorhandenheit). In our 
everyday context, we encounter things mostly as ready-to-hand.  
The ready-to-hand describes our practical relation to things that are 
handy or useful; entities are encountered as a continuous whole of 
interconnected relationships. This is our primordial relationship 
with the world, our lived experience. 
In Heideggerian analysis, when entities are encountered as “tools, 
objects of use, cultural products, things of value and significance,” 
(McDaniel, 2013, p. 332) they are called equipment.  Heidegger 
writes, “we shall call those entities which we encounter in concern 
„equipment‟.  In our dealings, we come across equipment for 
writing, sewing, working, transportation, measurement” 
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 97).  Equipment is a technical term in 
Heideggerian framework and is understood not in ontic but in an 
ontological sense and its meaning is not limited to physical tools 
alone, although Heidegger uses a hammer to elaborate this concept. 
Equipment then could be non-physical, a service mechanism, a sign 
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or an environment.  He writes that equipment taken in this 
ontological sense is not only equipment for writing or sewing, but 
“it includes everything we make use of domestically or in public 
life.  In this broad ontological sense streets, street lamps are also 
items of equipment” (Heidegger, 1988, p. 292). 
Imagine a carpenter who is engaged in his work of hammering 
encounters a hammer as equipment.  The carpenter in his 
familiarity with the hammer as well as the work which he is 
involved in, namely hammering, encounters it as a means, as an in-
order-to (Heidegger, 1962, p. 97 & Riemer, 2014, p. 276). This „in-
order-to‟ describes a relationship where one uses equipment to 
achieve a particular task; in the case of a carpenter, it is for driving 
nails in, removing nails, preening, or shaping.  While in action, 
hardly does one encounter a hammer as a wooden shaft with a 
metallic spherical blob.  The hammer as a tool conceals itself and its 
properties when it is ready-to-hand.  In the everyday practical use 
of hammering, the hammer withdraws from our direct attention 
and remains inconspicuous. It is its absence that makes it ready-to-
hand. Through the example of a hammer, Heidegger wants to 
demonstrate that in our everyday interactions, we encounter 
equipment not in a theoretical way but as an in-order-to. 
It is also possible that the same entity may appear for Dasein as 
present-at-hand when it is approached in a disengaged reflection.  
One may approach the entity out of mere curiosity, as an object of 
the first encounter, as an object of design, as an object of scientific 
enquiry and so on.  In all these instances, the entity is present-at-
hand for Dasein and the focus of attention gets shifted from the 
practical activity to the object itself through its properties.  At 
present-at-hand, an entity is viewed by us as lying inert, 
determinate and isolable (McDaniel, 2013, p. 334). 
Heidegger‟s point is that the being of the equipment is not fully 
revealed in one particular mode of its existence.  The hammer has 
the being of Zuhandenheit, disclosed through its performance and at 
the same time its being of Vorhandenheit is disclosed through 
disengaged observation or analysis.  Nevertheless, they are not two 
different kinds of entities but the same entity being encountered 
either as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand modes of being (p. 334).  
In Boedeker‟s (2005) words: 
Honeylal Puthussery                                           Ways of Being of Equipment 
35 
 
Presence-to-hand is neither a super-property nor a formal 
structure common to everything existent. Instead, it is one 
of the several ways in which we can encounter entities. It is 
to be contrasted, for example, with “readiness-at-hand” 
(Zuhandenheit), in which we encounter entities in terms of 
their usefulness (or uselessness) to our practical projects. 
Crucially, because „presence-to-hand‟ and „readiness-at-
hand‟ are just different ways of encountering what Heidegger 
calls “intraworldly entities” – a term coextensive with 
“physical objects” – they are not different kinds of entities. 
(p. 159) 
The error of modern science, Heidegger complains, is that it placed 
the „present-at-hand‟ mode of being as fundamental and superior 
while in reality, it is only one of the several ways in which we can 
encounter entities. Heidegger (1962) contrasts the practical 
understanding with a disinterested theoretical understanding:  
If we look at things just 'theoretically', we can get along 
without understanding „readiness-to-hand‟.  But when we 
deal with them by using them and manipulating them, this 
activity is not a blind one; it has its own kind of sight, by 
which our manipulation is guided…Dealings with 
equipment subordinate themselves to the manifold 
assignments of the „in-order-to‟. (p. 98) 
Heidegger calls such sight circumspection Umsicht; the original 
seeing is always in the context of our projects, its uses, as function 
as something in-order-to do something, and as something that 
points beyond itself according to the task at hand.  Every entity that 
is first grasped by our circumspection is „ready-to-hand‟ 
(Zuhandenheit) before the possibility of its being perceived or 
intuited as present-at-hand (Vorhandenheit) (Inwood, 1999, p. 129 & 
Riemer, 2011, p. 8).When the entities are looked at only as present-
at-hand, it loses its intrinsic meaning and warmth of relationship 
with other beings. It becomes a de-contextualised material, counted 
as one among the batch having only numerical representations. 
Such representations miss the richness and complexity of life to 
which the equipment is associated.  
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3. The Paradox of Invisibility 
Heidegger points out that „present-at-hand mode‟ of being is not 
what defines our everyday lives.  We are not beings who spend 
most of our everyday life in detached contemplation. Rather, we 
are beings often absorbed in certain practices.  When we are 
engaged in such practices “the world and all its contents, including 
things, artifacts, our body and others, are both invisible and 
subordinate to our practices” (Riemer, 2014, p. 277).  In other 
words, an entity withdraws into invisibility while being in use but 
becomes visible when there is a failure in its performance or when 
there is a detached observation.4 
Take the example of the world of a medical doctor who listens to a 
patient‟s heartbeats through a stethoscope. The stethoscope is so 
much part of her that it appears to her not as an object made of a 
certain definable substance extended over a geographical location 
in space and time but as something which is useful for carrying out 
her work. The stethoscope shapes her view of reality.  In the words 
of Don Ihde, she develops an embodiment relation (Ihde, 2009. 
pp.42-44).  That is, when she listens to a patient‟s heartbeat through 
a stethoscope, the stethoscope has an influence on the way she 
perceives the patient‟s medical condition.  Partially, the stethoscope 
disappears from her awareness, as the hammer did in Heidegger‟s 
example. We can state this relationship as (doctor - stethoscope) 
world. The parentheses indicate that the stethoscope has become a 
part of herself in her viewing of the outside world.  The stethoscope 
withdraws from her awareness and becomes embodied in her.   
It is also possible to have a hermeneutic relation (Ihde, 2009, p. 42-
44).  When a doctor wants to have information about what happens 
inside the patient‟s body, she reads the X-ray and MRI reports.  It is 
then taken for granted that what is read is closely connected to the 
patient‟s body.  In this case, the medical reports as tools for 
observing do not become a part of the doctor‟s body but of the 
world she observes.  The relationship can then be presented 
asdoctor (medical report-world). Heidegger (1988) writes: 
We do not always and continually have explicit perception 
of the things surrounding us in a familiar environment, 
certainly not in such a way that we would be aware of them 
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expressly as handy. It is precisely because an explicit 
awareness and assurance of their being at hand does not 
occur that we have them around us in a peculiar way, just 
as they are in themselves. (p. 309) 
This invisibility of equipment in a familiar context or when the 
equipment functions well is the paradox of equipment.  The 
equipment hides or remains inconspicuous when in use.  
Heidegger says the equipment withdraws as we concern ourselves 
in the work (Heidegger, 1962, p. 98).  When the doctor is fully 
absorbed in listening to the heartbeat of the patient, she hardly 
notices the stethoscope because she is preoccupied in her act of 
listening or caring.  This invisibility is exactly the paradoxical 
nature of a thing encountered by us as ready-to-hand.  Invisibility 
is not presented as anything less desirable here but as a positive 
feature of equipment.  An equipment‟s ready-to-hand is revealed 
not when we look at it or when we study it reflectively but only 
when we use it.  As Kai Reimer puts it, “equipment is truly 
encountered as what it is only when it is not experienced at 
all”(Riemer, 2014, p. 277). Only a broken, malfunctioned equipment 
announces itself of its presence.  A broken hammer, hanged 
computer, missing tool, misplaced spectacles, a failed system of 
service network and so on, loudly announce their presence.  
As long as the stethoscope functions normally, it allows the doctor 
to be fully engaged in her ministry of healing.  Good equipment 
always withdraws and remains unobtrusive.  In such an 
engagement, “the distinction between self and external world 
(including others) fades; we are absorbed with the task at hand in 
such a way that we „lose ourselves‟ in what we do”(p. 277). 
Heidegger writes, “the self must forget itself, if lost in the world of 
equipment, it‟s able to actually go to work and manipulate 
something” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 405). 
4. Equipment as a System 
Dasein encounters equipment in his everyday world not as a 
separate isolable determinate object or collection of objects.  It is 
always encountered as a system with an „in-order-to‟ structure as 
Heidegger calls it.  Heidegger (1962) says:  
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Taken strictly, there „is‟ no such thing as an equipment.  To 
the Being of any equipment there always belongs a totality 
of equipment, in which it can be this equipment that it is.  
Equipment is essentially „something in-order-to...‟. A 
totality of equipment is constituted by various ways of the 
'in-order-to', such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, 
manipulability. (p. 97) 
This in-order-to is an essential structure of equipment that is 
present within the world which Heidegger calls an assignment.  
Dasein discovers what an equipment is in its „in-order-to‟, that is, in 
its „ready-at-hand‟ mode.  In that sense, a stethoscope is 
encountered not as metal wires and diaphragm, but as a „to-listen-
to-heartbeat’.  A smart mobile phone appears as that which allows 
me to make calls and send text messages.  A car, even if it is an old 
clunker, is encountered first of all as a medium of transportation 
and then as freedom, empowerment, independence, status and so 
on.  No matter how fashionable a car is, if it does not function as an 
automobile that helps transportation, it cannot be called a car.  This 
is because one encounters a car primordially in everyday dealings 
as an equipment „in-order-to‟-transport.  This reveals to us a 
fundamental truth about the ways of being of equipment.  
Equipments are often encountered by Dasein not on the basis of its 
scientific or metaphysical properties but by its use in a particular 
situation constituted by other equipments and human practices. 
Every single piece of equipment is part of a system of equipment 
and therefore, constituted by the members of the system.  Just like 
Dasein is always „being-in-the-world‟, equipment is „being-in-
totality‟ of equipment.  Heidegger brings forth a different 
understanding of equipment that there is no such „thing‟ as a piece 
of equipment (p. 97). Equipment, when viewed in material terms, 
appears as a mere „thing‟.  The ontic understanding of equipment 
ignores completely that the being of any equipment is constituted 
by a totality of equipment (Heidegger, 1962, p. 98 & Munday, 2006). 
In fact, every individual item of equipment is understood as 
belonging to another equipment. 
Consider the example of encountering a room.  My room is a piece 
of equipment and it is also beyond a single piece in the sense that it 
is a collection of other equipment that come together to constitute a 
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room.  It is not just encountered as a geometrical space 'between 
four walls' but as an equipment for residing constituted by other 
equipments and human practices such as paper, pen, table, lamp, 
furniture, computer, printer, router, wires, windows, doors, room 
and so on. It also includes certain accepted behaviours in personal 
rooms.  That an 'individual' item of equipment shows itself in a 
totality of equipment has already been discovered (Heidegger, 
1962, p. 98 & Munday, 2009). 
Each tool in the totality of equipment occupies a specific position in 
the system.  The system or the totality of equipment (according to 
Heidegger) is similar to the world of Heidegger.  While the ontic 
understanding of the world is a collection of entities, with each 
entity having a predetermined structure, the ontological 
understanding of the world is relational in nature where the world 
is not fixed or absolute but emerges as a result of a heterogeneous 
network of entities rather than an assemblage. The individual tools 
computers, wires, mobiles, printers, tables and electricity are part 
of this world but these artifacts are not considered equipment in 
the Heideggerian sense. Even the sum of all the individual items of 
tools does not make up the totality of equipment.  The equipment 
as a network of related entities, which is also constituted by the 
assignment for which the individual piece of equipment stands, 
remains concealed when the focus is only on just an artefact. For 
example, the hammer as a tool by itself is a mere constituent of 
hammering.  Harman (2002) summarises Heidegger‟s point very 
well: 
All possibility of independent objects existing in a vacuum 
outside the world of relations, functions, significations. For 
him, the tool in the reality of its labor belongs to a world-
system, one that has swallowed up all individual 
components into a single world-effect. It is only from out of 
this system that specific beings can ever emerge. (p. 24) 
Heidegger calls the systemic feature of the equipment totality.  The 
metal wires, diaphragm, a sound transducer, the audio codec 
electronics, the speakers, binaural tubes, batteries, and so on in a 
stethoscope if taken alone do not mean the same. It is in 
combination with many other minutely engineered pieces together.  
Stethoscope always bears for what it is on other equipment with 
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which it is constituted. A stethoscope is a tool „to-listen-to‟ 
heartbeats only in and through its relation to various other tool-
pieces.  So, the first insight is that no individual item of equipment 
stands alone but is drawn into a system of tool-pieces making an 
equipment.  The task of stethoscopping cannot come about without 
this totality of equipment, nevertheless, in our ontic consideration, 
we are hardly conscious of this totality.  Equipment, in fact, 
functions “by vanishing in favor of the visible reality that it brings 
about”(Harman, 2002, p. 25) - metal wires and diaphragm in favor 
of stethoscope and carpenter‟s tools in favor of the visible house.  
Every withdrawal equipment “allows the ultimate reference to 
swallow all of its component forces into an invisible system or 
network lying silently beneath it”(p. 25).  Present-at-hand is what is 
visible of equipment and what is behind the visible reality is ready-
to-hand. Behind every equipment there is an anonymous labour, as 
Harman calls it (p. 26). 
The second insight is that equipment gains its identity and 
meaning only in our concernful dealings and in the context of its 
use.  Equipment always draws its particular „in-order-to‟ from its 
place in the referential whole (Heidegger, 1962, p. 99 & Riemer, 
2011, p. 7).  Heidegger says “the structure of the Being of what is 
ready-to-hand as equipment is determined by references or 
assignments (Verweisung)” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 105). These 
references or assignments have an “in-order-to” structure (p. 97).  
By referential totality, Heidegger implies that an individual item of 
equipment appears as referring to other entities within a totality of 
equipment (Sinclair, 2006, p. 57).  The stethoscope is a part of a 
doctor‟s everyday tools; it refers to the user.  It has a purpose-an 
“in-order-to”.  It also refers to various material things with which it 
is made of.  As Mark Sinclair puts it: “These references are not the 
„things‟ themselves but rather constitute the horizon in which they 
can appear, a horizon of meaning or sense by virtue of which items 
of equipment can be encountered as referring to one another.”  
These web of references or assignments themselves are not 
explicitly noticed but “they are rather 'there' when we concernfully 
submit ourselves to them…”. It becomes explicit only when the 
“assignment has been disturbed-when something is unusable for 
some purpose”(Heidegger, 1962, p. 105). 
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Heidegger writes on such occasions, “the context of equipment is lit 
up…With this totality, however, the world announces itself” (p. 
105). The structure of this referential totality is an a priori 
transcendental horizon, which Heidegger calls „worldhood‟. 
“„Worldhood‟ is an ontological concept and stands for the structure 
of one of the constitutive items of Being-in-the-world…moreover, 
that assignments and referential totalities could in some sense 
become constitutive for worldhood itself”(p. 92 & 107).  This 
horizon, according to Heidegger is a system of relations which is 
the constitutive structure of the equipment‟s way of being (p. 121). 
We often consider an equipment as a mere thing and forget about 
the totality of the equipment.  However, the important thing, as 
Harman points out is not our finding that “equipment is always 
found in conjunction with related items…but (sic) what is essential 
is that at the level of readiness-to-hand, the idea of a single tool 
reposing in its solitary effect is shown to be untenable.  Instead, 
individual equipment is already dissolved into a global tool-
empire”(p. 22). 
5. Contextuality of Equipment 
Equipment is always encountered in the background of some 
“specific familiarities” and “competencies for dealing things and 
others” (Hall, 1993, p. 131).  For example, a stethoscope becomes 
equipment for someone as „ready-to-hand‟ only if that person is 
familiar with the practical environment specific to health care and a 
“network of practical relations” associated with it.  To a person not 
acquainted with medical practices, the stethoscope is only present-
at-hand.  Along with the specific familiarities and coping skills 
associated with healthcare activities and practical settings, the user 
still needs a broader range of familiarities which are more basic and 
fundamental to deal with any tools (p. 132).  Dreyfus calls it the 
suitability and appropriateness of equipment (Dreyfus, 2007); that 
is, if an artefact has to become a piece of equipment, first of all, it 
needs to be suitable for a project. The suitability comes only when it 
has all the required material properties enabling it to do the project.  
But this kind of suitability alone is not sufficient though it is a 
necessary condition for something to be an equipment (Riemer, 
2014, p. 279). 
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The appropriateness of equipment depends upon its relation to the 
totality of other equipment, shared practices involved in it, user 
competencies and other broader social orthodoxies which can be 
meaningful only in specific contexts (Reimer, 2014, p. 280 & 
Dreyfus, 1980, pp. 7-9).Dreyfus calls these practical holism, a broader 
horizon which is a prerequisite for interpreting what it means to be 
a human being, a tool, dining in a party, participating in Eucharistic 
celebration, citizen, student, doctor, employee, and so on.  One 
acquires these social background practices by being brought up in a 
specific context and not by forming beliefs and learning rules.  
Heidegger calls it "befindlichkeiten" translated as “attunement” - a 
state one finds oneself in without any deliberate doing, finding 
oneself in a context before one settles into it, “the state in which one 
may be found”. (Liberman, 2012, p. 53 & Heidegger, 1962, p. 172)  
This background cannot be made explicit in a theoretical form 
through a detached analysis (Dreyfus, 1980, p. 8).  One may contest 
that a certain amount of rule learning is requireed even for the 
basic skills like body movements or language speaking let alone 
encountering equipment.  It is accepted while at the same time once 
the user becomes proficient “such rules, (sic) are left behind and a 
single unified, flexible, purposive pattern of behaviour is all that 
remains;” and it is a futile effort to formalise these procedures (p. 
8).  Heidegger (1962) writes:  
The context of assignments or references, which, as 
significance, 'is constitutive for worldhood, can be taken 
formally in the sense of a system of Relations…The 
phenomenal content of these 'Relations' and 'Relata'… resist 
any sort of mathematical functionalization ; nor are they 
merely something thought, first posited in an 'act of 
thinking.' They are rather relationships in which concernful 
circumspection as such already dwells. (p. 122) 
An entity in its explicit form is discovered only in the background 
of network of relations-familiarity and expertise, which are often 
non-representable (Hall, 1993, pp. 131-32). Heidegger calls it 
primordial truth or primordial understanding.  These different 
background practices enable the user to encounter the equipment 
differently.  This is the reason why in our concernful dealing with 
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the equipment, certain features become relevant or irrelevant (p. 
134). 
No equipment is self-evident. Rather, everything is trapped in 
supplimentarity. Therefore, the appropriateness of an individual 
piece of equipment is subjective to the shared background 
practices; the system of relations.  Individual tools like screws, 
bolts, spans, decks, girders, rails, pile footings and so on gain 
identity and meaning by getting swallowed into the larger system 
of the bridge.  Thus, the meaning of an individual tool is 
discovered in its use, and meaning of equipment is discovered in 
the wider context of what it is being used for in its larger 
equipmental way of being in the world.  So there is no terminal 
point to its ultimate finality. It can rather be said that it is circular in 
nature (Munday, 2006 & Heidegger, 1962, p. 107). 
The same artefacts need not be considered appropriate in another 
context.  For instance, a cell phone is generally used by Gen X'ers or 
Baby Boomers only to make calls or texts.  But the same smart 
phone may appear to a millennial as that which allows gaming, 
web browsing, photography and creating and maintaining virtual 
communities or the automobile signals become meaningful in the 
context of vehicles and traffic regulations (Heidegger, 1962, p. 109). 
Harman puts it rightly, “for Heidegger equipment is its context” 
(Harman, 2002, p. 23). A piece of equipment always remains 
opaque outside of its proper context (Munday, 2006). 
The insight we must draw from this discussion is not that 
individual item of equipment gains its meaning and value 
depending upon the context but the key insight is that every tool is 
drawn into a certain system of relations which defines and 
determines its ways of being.  Thus each tool occupies a certain 
unique position in the system of relations which is constitutive of 
the equipmental structure.  This totality of equipment is not just a 
sum total of ontic entities or a place where tool-pieces are situated 
but it is a unitary phenomenon where the entire individual realm is 
already dissolved while in act (Harman, 2002, p. 22). Heidegger 
calls it an equipmental way of being (Heidegger, 1962, p. 146 & 
Munday, 2006). 
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6. Seeing Beyond the Present 
This section re-engages with the previous themes that we discussed 
by placing them in relation to design. Design in terms of functional 
performance, ergonomic comfort and aesthetic value is closer and 
familiar to us while the ontological conditions behind design 
remain far removed from us. There is a danger in limiting ourselves 
with the ontic understanding of equipment because it hides from 
us the true nature of equipment‟s character and makes us believe 
that it is an isolated instance of a piece of artefact helping us to do 
some function. What this paper tries to point out is that the current 
design concerns should extend far beyond the physical and 
measurable ontic features to include the forgotten ontological 
sphere which organises and structures our thinking and 
experiences. Overlooking the ontological basis of equipment is a 
krisis situation of the design practice of our times5 (Buckley, 1992, p. 
9). 
The enigma of design field today is the forgetfulness of its original 
unity between ontic and ontological design, ignoring the relational 
dimension of design. This has come about because we are being 
trapped in a particular metaphysical tradition often referred to 
under various nomenclatures such as „rationalistic,‟ „Cartesian,‟ 
„objectivist,‟ and often associated with related terms such as 
„mechanistic‟ (worldview), „reductionistic‟ (science), „positivistic‟ 
(epistemologically) and, more recently, computationalist” (Escobar, 
p. 16).Heidegger would call it machination or at other times in his 
later writings as gestell6 (Joronen, 2012, p. 373).  Machination is the 
emergence of the manipulative power as a possessive and coercive 
force of ordering and gestell is the technological enframing of things 
into standing in reserve. It is the outgrowth of a long western 
metaphysical tradition called metaphysics of presence globally 
expanding its willful orderings manifested in our everyday lived 
experience, market mechanisms, business rationalities including 
design practices (p. 373). 
Any attempt to reduce equipment only to its immediate utility or 
physical appearance is a fallen state.  Heidegger calls it the 
forgetfulness of the real nature of being.  The being of artefacts 
withdraws and therefore will always be more than whatever we 
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see or say about it. It is elusive and not directly available to us, 
therefore, needing interpretation.  Trying to know them only by 
what is present is a kind of reductionism.  In Being and Time, 
Heidegger criticises this interpretation of being that has come about 
since the time of Greeks “without any explicit knowledge of the 
clues which function here, without any acquaintance with the 
fundamental ontological function of time or even any 
understanding of it and without any insight into the reason why 
this function is possible”(Heidegger, 1962, p. 48). Heidegger 
cautions us about the consequence of metaphysics of presence when 
he says, “entities are grasped in their Being as „presence‟; this 
means that they are understood with regard to a definite mode of 
time; the „Present‟”(p. 47).The equipment appears to me in my 
temporality and gains its meaning as the totality of my existential 
possibilities. Equipment, therefore, must be defined by more than 
“what is present”. It gains its identity by belonging to an 
“equipmental totality” that is shaped by its ways to be in time. So, 
the equipment is more than what it appears to us.   
In a certain sense, Heidegger spent the whole of his philosophic 
career to clarify this insight that being is not presence.  Being is not 
presence because being is time as Heidegger writes, “being is 
understandable only by way of time.  If we are to think being and 
speak of being, and do it properly without confusing being with 
any beings, then we have to think and speak of it in temporal 
concepts and terms.”(Heidegger, 1988, p. xxv).The primordial 
ontological basis of human's existentiality is time or temporality. 
Time is a unitary phenomenon continuously extended to the past 
and future and cannot be limited to the present. Heidegger prefers 
to call it ecstatic nature of time in the sense of reaching out beyond 
itself. This ecstatical nature of time is foundational to human‟s way 
of being. We stand out into our future possibilities, into a past 
heritage, and into a present world.  The krisis in design practice of 
our time is that we have forgotten the basic ecstatical nature and 
confined ourselves with only the present while the future is the 
primary dimension of our existence. So, the krisis lies in human‟s 
failure to see our own existential possibilities (Rojcewicz, 2006, pp. 
141-43). Human may progress in perfecting our scientific seeing 
and yet be blind to our own conditions that would make us fixated 
in the ecstasy of the present.  
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At the first glance, being is not presence seems to be a technical 
jargon but a closer look would tell us that it is something that 
happens in our everyday world. We normally consider a thing to 
be what appears to us in terms of how useful it is to us or its 
physical body.  This is very obvious in the case of, say, mobile or 
the fluorescent lamps that we often use.  But Heidegger would say 
that to describe a mobile or fluorescent lamp by referring only to its 
usage, outer appearance, or by concepts, is a misrepresentation 
because there is always something more to it than whatever we see 
or say.  The being of things such as mobiles and fluorescent lamp 
lights is not fully present before us. Heidegger calls it “ways to be”, 
in other words, being (Heidegger, 1962, p. 172 & 418). 
We use a fluorescent lamp or a mobile without noticing it.  
Whenever I switch on the lamp in my room, my focus is only on 
the light that helps me see things in my room.  My attention turns 
to the lamp only when it fails to provide me with enough light.  
The same is the case with the mobile. We notice it only when it 
breaks down.  The true being of things is actually a kind of absence. 
Since things can never be directly or completely present to us, we 
are always interpreting more than seeing. 
But absence does not engulf the fluorescent lamp or the mobile. It is 
only one side of it.  Had it not been so, we would not have seen 
anything.  Thus, there are many visible aspects of the mobile or the 
lamp to which I see and relate to. These visible aspects vary 
depending on who encounters it. Every time I encounter a thing, 
certain aspects of its being remain hidden from me; for example, 
it‟s past.  While the others come present to me as having features to 
be “interpreted as tools, weapons, or items of entertainment.”  The 
presence of every object is a dynamic interplay of presence and 
absence.  The description of mobile and fluorescent lamps can be 
extrapolated to the being of all entities, including human beings.  
Being discloses itself in this play of presence and absence.  
Heidegger calls this experience „event‟ (ereignis) by which he meant 
happening, occurrence, becoming visible (Inwood, 1999, pp. 54-57). We 
understand this experience in our concern for the world; 
identifying it only with cognitive experience and describing it in 
terms of a subject-object relation is a misunderstanding of what 
being is. 
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By saying this, Heidegger does not mean that presence is 
insignificant. Rather, his contention is that though presence is rich 
and complex it does not exhaust the meaning of Being.  Prioritising 
a certain mode of temporality, that is, understanding the „being of 
equipment‟ only in terms of presencing of things (Anwesen)7 in the 
present, has devastating consequences. For example, 
understanding equipment as tools or machines is concrete and 
easily graspable because it is present before us. While equipment 
defined as a system is more complex and accommodates many 
absent elements as its constituents such as inventors, operators, 
recyclers, consumers, user knowledge, marketers, advertisers, 
government administrators, and so forth, Krippendorff (2006) 
points out how designers are blinded towards the unintended uses 
and users of equipment:  
Before a product reaches its intended user group, it passes 
through the hands of many who use it for a variety of 
reasons: to solve an engineering problem, to keep jobs in a 
factory, to profit from increased sales, or to supply 
supporting gadgets. After its intended use, it may become 
of interest to repair shops, benefit recycling companies, and 
become an ecological nightmare for communities that live 
near dumps. (p. 64) 
Limiting design concerns only to the producer‟s profit or the 
experience of the end-user at the expense of all the others who are 
touched by the equipment presents a krisis situation. The so-called 
end users are only just one point of contact in the vast network 
equipmental totality who need to co-operate to bring a design to 
presence. Designers are surrounded by many factors which have an 
interest in the outcome of a design process: clients, engineers, 
labour force, financiers, sales representatives, recyclers, 
environment, other living beings, researchers and so on. Design 
practices say little about them while much is written and argued 
about the end users (p. 63). Accommodating these factors into the 
design process of a tool or equipment helps design it better and 
makes the process more democratic and inclusive. 
The world we are living in is facing unprecedented challenges 
which call for new approaches in design than „business as usual‟ 
(Wahl, 2016, p. 9). But our design practices are caught up with 
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providing quick fix solutions.  Our universities, industries, 
infrastructures, energy systems, water management, health 
systems, agriculture – all need a new form of knowledge that can 
guide us to a new way of being in this world, a way of being that is 
concerned beyond the present. The current design practices, as Tony 
Fry says, take away our future because we do not know how to 
create conditions for the future.8This has come about because we 
are living in an illusion of permanence which is an outgrowth of 
the metaphysics of presence. We are glued to the present as if it is 
permanent. An obsession with the present deeply influences our 
thinking and actions and becomes a hindrance for a collaborative 
relational culture of design. We design systems with a win-lose 
mindset which works on the assumption that the other has to be 
dominated, won over, and subdued. This process is always 
progressing in a gigantic proportion in the world and the most 
characteristic of this designing or way of coming-to-presence is the 
transformation of the world into a totalised network of resources. 
In this age, it means that beings are given to us configured as 
standing-in-reserve, as disposables, as stocks; everything around us 
in the world is seen as something there for us to consume. The 
entire world becomes a bestand, a stock, existing in a manner 
which makes it ready for our use.  
This has come about, according to Heidegger, because we are being 
unconsciously trapped in the dehumanising process of everyday 
normalisation. We are being normalised in a particular ontological 
tradition which encourages us to pose as masters of the earth, 
centers of the universe and yet blind to the self - condition that 
makes us slaves.9  What we need today is to create conditions for 
the future by developing systems which necessitates win-win 
situations for every stakeholder which also ensures the benefit of 
nature (pp. 8-9). 
7. Conclusion 
Fostering inclusive design approach to equipment needs 
questioning an ontological tradition that valorizes presence over 
absence. It calls for revisioning a relational ontology which claims 
that “the relations between entities are ontologically more 
fundamental than the entities themselves” (Wildman, 2010, p. 55). 
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If this relational ontology needs to be operationalised in design 
practices, a significant amount of reconstruction of the current 
design paradigms is required. This paper is only a discussion about 
the philosophical phase of this reconstructive process. The bias 
against relational ways of being is operative in market-based 
design practices of our time.  The notion that a tool exists as a 
separate entity having its own predetermined structure continues 
to be one of the “most enduring naturalized, and deleterious 
fictions” of our cultures these days (Escobar, p. 19 & Dreyfus, 2011, 
pp. 241-242). 
One decisive step towards this is to encourage more and more 
serious ontological discussions in design practices. Heidegger is 
one of the contemporary philosophers who has made ontological 
questioning central to his thought than any other philosopher of 
our time. Ontological understanding of equipment brings to the 
fore the relational nature of the equipment‟s way of being in the 
world and this interconnectedness of beings has tremendous 
implication for an understanding design agency, design process 
and design object. Design practices, then, need to broaden its focus 
beyond the work of what we might call proximate designers- those 
professionals closest to the design process, such as, engineers, 
architects, draftsmen, graphical artists, and so on who exercise 
direct control over the details of design (Feng, 2004, p. 105).Little 
attention has been paid to the ways in which cultural assumptions 
and values about the product, the future unintended uses of the 
product, various stakeholders of the product, ethical issues, the 
meanings that product forms have for their users, and so forth have 
the potential to shape the design process. Limiting design agency 
only to proximate designers is autocratic, one dimensional and 
exclusive and adds to the krisis situation. 
Our future depends on creating systems that are interdependent. 
This is possible only if we have a relational ontology at the back of 
our mind to inspire our actions. Integrating ontological insights 
with contemporary popular design methodologies which are 
market-centric may help us seek the possibilities of how alternative 
values can be brought into the design process so that designs are 
sustainable, humane, ethical, liberating and eco-efficient rather 
than oppressing, controlling and exploitative. It will also help the 
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design methodologists in translating philosophical insights into 
conceptual design tools to improve the quality of the designs.  
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End notes 
1Heidegger uses the German word, Dasein to represent human beings.  In 
everyday German, this word would mean “existence”, or “being-there”.  
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Heidegger reserves this word to denote only the human existence 
because it differs ontologically from all other beings. 
2Being-in-the-world is the first among the existentials that Heidegger 
analyses.  The order of presentation of these existentials tells us that his 
analysis flows from the general awareness of the way in which the 
world presents itself to us to the specific existentials. 
3In Heidegger, it is a debatable issue whether an artefact is inert or work.  
Heidegger‟s early writings emphasise the need of Dasein for the entities 
to be present.  But the later Heideggerian writings do not seem to be 
privileging Dasein among the entities.  For example, he redeems the 
thinghood of jug from Dasein‟s concernful engagement.  The jug may 
depend upon Dasein for its production but its thinghood is not enslaved 
to Dasein (Harman, 2013, p. 130 & McDaniel, 2013, p. 332). 
4Heidegger explains the visible and invisible aspects of an entity in Being 
and Time, (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 95-102). 
5The Greek word krisis is used here to denote a dispute or quarrel, a 
dividing of original unity.  
6We find a shift from Machenschaft in the 1930s to Gestell in the mid- and 
late-1940s in Heideggerian writings. 
7Juan Pablo Hernández, argues that Heidegger‟s conception that being as 
presencing has undergone changes at different periods of his writing.  
Heidegger was critical of the Greek conception of being as presence 
(presence as Anwesenheit); but later he equates the meaning of being 
with 'anwesen' which signifies presencing (presencing as Anwesen) in 
his later works(Juan Pablo, 2011). 
8“Defuturing delivers another agenda of thinking, making and living 
which recognises that the future is not a vast void, but a time and place 
constituted by directional forces of design set in train in the past and the 
present and which flows into the future”(Fry, 1999, p. IX). 
9The slavish attitude which Heidegger talks about could be compared to 
the prisoners in Plato‟s A l l e g o r y  of the Cave. It pictures the 
metaphysical and epistemological situation of a human. 
 
